


1 December 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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\*UK-Rhodesia-Zambia: [The British Government is moving toward a tougher position on Rhodesia including both plans for sending RAF units to Zambia and imposing stricter economic sanctions against Rhodesia.]

[Minister for Economic Affairs George Brown told US officials in London that Prime Minister Wilson and his cabinet have agreed that a "quick kill" is necessary as the Rhodesian situation cannot be allowed to drag on. According to the US Embassy in London, the UK Government now recognizes that its initial measures were inadequate and that African pressures as well as Britain's world position now demand more drastic action.]

[The UK proposes to station an RAF jet fighter squadron at Ndola in northern Zambia and to place RAF ground forces at the airfields there, in Lusaka, and possibly at Livingstone, on the condition that Zambia not accept military forces from other countries unless both the UK and Zambia agree. Wilson's announcement of this move has been delayed thus far by the failure to secure agreement from President Kaunda. Commonwealth Relations Secretary Bottomley has gone to Lusaka to discuss the proposal.]

[Brown revealed that the UK also plans to announce a series of new economic measures against Rhodesia. These include an extension of the UK ban on imports from Rhodesia to include all food, minerals and metals, comprising 99 percent of the present UK imports from Rhodesia. The UK also will announce stringent financial controls, including additional restrictions on the use of sterling balances.]

[The next step would be a selective control of UK exports to Rhodesia, but London stresses that this can be done only in concert with other major Western industrial countries.]

(continued)

[The British, fearing new UN and African pressures for action on implementing the oil embargo called for by the UN, are continuing to explore various possibilities with major oil producers. They still are not convinced, however, that an oil embargo will be effective, and insist that no blockade measures are being considered.]

[London wishes to move quickly with contingency planning for economic aid to Zambia in the event of Rhodesian countermeasures, and plans to dispatch a high-level ministerial mission soon to Zambia to deal with this problem.]

\* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Indonesia: Sukarno and the army still remain at loggerheads, but the military's anti-Communist campaign is continuing.

The PKI was banned in yet another region yesterday--this time West Borneo. Leading members of the PKI are still being rounded up. The US Embassy believes that all but one or two members of the party's politburo have now been captured.

A number of prominent, extreme left-wing politicians are also apparently under some form of detention, generally house arrest. In moving against these non-Communist politicians, who have enjoyed Sukarno's protection, the army is again risking a direct confrontation with the President. However, [redacted] the Embassy's deputy chief of mission gathered the impression during a recent interview with Sukarno that he is reconciled to the eventual demise of the PKI itself as a political force.

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Peking, meanwhile, continues to highlight charges of the maltreatment of Chinese nationals by Indonesians. NCNA yesterday carried the text of the two latest in a series of Chinese diplomatic notes to Djakarta--dated 26 and 27 November--strongly protesting alleged incidents of Indonesian "persecution."

The two latest notes reflect a slightly greater sense of urgency in demanding that the Indonesians take "immediate" countermeasures. Like the previous Chinese notes of 4 and 19 November, the new notes omit any specific threat of Chinese retaliation.

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Brazil: [The dissatisfaction of hard-line Brazilian military officers may be reaching a critical stage.]

Cavalcanti's arrest followed publication of an open letter over his signature protesting the inauguration of Governor-elect Negrao de Lima in Guanabara on 5 December. Hard-liners bitterly resent Negrao de Lima's election because of his association with former president Kubitschek and his acceptance of Communist Party support during the campaign. Castello Branco has promised to permit Negrao de Lima's inauguration and seems determined to resist demands that he block it.]

Castello Branco has moved to strengthen his control over the politically potent First Army--headquartered in the Rio area--by naming a non-political general as the new commander and ordering the transfer of a number of troublesome officers.]

Although such measures increase the chances that the inaugural date will pass without serious consequences, installation of Negrao de Lima's certain to add to the disillusionment with Castello Branco that has been building up among the military hard-liners.]

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NOTES

Singapore-Malaysia: [Malaysian Prime Minister Rahman is said to have decided to use economic sanctions against Singapore rather than try to interdict the barter trade between Singapore and Indonesia scheduled to begin today. Such action is likely to include a tax on Malayan rubber exported through Singapore, which would seriously damage Singapore's economy.]

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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